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1 Introduction
In the last two decades, public procurement has received increasing 
attention from both academia and the government. Many pieces of legislation 
have been promulgated in an attempt to shape a more efficient and effective 
public procurement system. Amongst them is the Preferential Procurement 
Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 (“PPPFA”) and its Regulations1 that came 
into operation during 2017. It is well known that public procurement can be 
used for collateral objectives other than obtaining goods, works or services at 
the best value. One of these objectives includes the advancement of previously 
disadvantaged individuals and companies. This is primarily what the PPPFA 
seeks to promote. 
The construction industry has been one of the industries in South Africa in 
which a sophisticated public procurement system has been created. As in the 
case of public procurement in general, procurement in the construction industry 
or construction procurement has the promotion of previous- or historically 
disadvantaged contractors as a primary goal. This article aims to determine 
how provisions on subcontracting in the 2017 Regulations affect construction 
procurement and whether there are any pitfalls in its implementation. The 
article will set out the regulation of construction procurement law, the manner 
in which preferential procurement is implemented in South Africa, and the 
impact of the subcontracting provisions on construction procurement. Lastly, 
recommendations are made for the interpretation of these Regulations. 
2 Regulatory framework for construction procurement
Section 217(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(“Constitution”) provides that when contracting for goods or services, organs 
of state in the national, provincial or local sphere of government or institutions 
identified in national legislation must do so in accordance with a system that 
is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective. Section 217(2) in 
1 GN R 32 in GG 40553 of 20-01-2017.
turn provides for the use of procurement as a policy tool. This provision states 
that organs of state or institutions in subsection (1) are not prevented from 
implementing procurement policies providing for categories of preference in 
the allocation of contracts and the protection or advancement of persons, or 
categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. Section 217(3) 
prescribes that a national legislative framework must be enacted in terms of 
which preferential procurement policies as contemplated in subsection (2) 
must be implemented. This legislative framework is the PPPFA.
The legislation applicable to public sector construction procurement are 
those applicable to public procurement in general,2 namely, the Construction 
Industry Development Board Act 38 of 2000 (“CIDB Act”), the Regulations 
to the Act3 and the prescripts issued by the Construction Industry 
Development Board (“CIDB”) in terms of the CIDB Act. Section 2 of the 
CIDB Act establishes the CIDB as a juristic person and regulatory board for 
the construction industry and construction procurement in particular. The 
Act delineates the powers and functions of the board and requires a register 
of contractors to be created to ensure efficient procurement practices and to 
facilitate public sector construction procurement. Contractors are required to 
apply for registration on the Register of Contractors in order to tender for 
government construction contracts. Regulation 2 of the 2017 Regulations 
states that those entities bound by the Regulations are those that qualify as 
“organs of state” as defined by the PPPFA. Section 1 of the Act defines an 
organ of state as:
“(a) a national or provincial department as defined in the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 
No. 1 of 1999);
 (b) a municipality as contemplated in the Constitution;
 (c) a constitutional institution defined in the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act No. 1 of 
1999);
 (d) Parliament;
 (e) a provincial legislature;
 (f) any other institution or category of institutions included in the definition of “organ of state” in 
section 239 of the Constitution and recognised by the Minister by notice in the Government 
Gazette as an institution or category of institutions to which this Act applies;”4
The CIDB resorts under subsection (f) of the above section. It is an 
institution as defined in national legislation, particularly in section 239(b)
(ii) of the Constitution which refers to an institution identified in national 
legislation (the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA)) which 
2 It includes the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999, the Local Government: Municipal Finance 
Management Act 56 of 2003 and the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. The Supreme 
Court of Appeal has held that the invitation, evaluation and award of tenders is of an administrative 
law nature, therefore the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 applies. Furthermore, the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 is applicable as it regulates access to any information 
held by both the government and private parties. The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 
53 of 2003 (“BBBEE Act”) is applicable to preferential procurement in that it regulates black economic 
empowerment. Lastly, the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 is aimed 
at curbing corruption in procurement processes and is therefore relevant. Legislation, which regulate 
procurement in general, also prescribe that the specific prescripts of the CIDB apply to construction 
procurement alongside the general legislation.
3 GN R8986 in GG 31603 of 14-11-2008.
4 Original emphasis.
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performs a public function or exercises a public power in terms of legislation 
(the CIDB Act). The PPPFA and its Regulations therefore bind the CIDB 
in the creation of its construction procurement rules for the industry. The 
following section will explain the implementation of preferential procurement 
as dictated by the PPPFA.
3 Preferential procurement in South Africa
3 1  Brief background
Based on South Africa’s political past in which discriminatory policies and 
practices prevented the majority of the country to participate in government 
contracting, new legislation was enacted after 1994 in order to redress this. 
The most relevant piece of legislation was the PPPFA. In applying a points 
system when awarding government contracts, the Act seeks to encourage 
the involvement of historically disadvantaged individuals to tender for 
government contracts. In what follows, the manner in which the Act must be 
implemented in construction procurement will be discussed.
3 2 Points system 
Section 2 of the PPPFA provides for a points system in terms of which 
preference must be awarded. This is set out in Regulations 6 and 7 of the 2017 
Regulations which provide for an 80/20 points system in respect of contracts 
up to a value of R50 million and a 90/10 points system in respect of contracts 
exceeding R50 million, respectively. This means that 80 or 90 points must be 
awarded for the price5 of a tender and 20 or 10 points for preference. 
In addition, Regulations 6 and 7 indicate for which preference points must 
be awarded. It states that a tenderer must provide proof of its Broad-Based 
Black Economic Empowerment (“B-BBEE”) status level of contributor.6 
A failure to do so will not lead to the tenderer being disqualified, but that 
points only for price out of 80 or 90 will be awarded. B-BBEE is referred to 
in Regulation 1 as broad-based black economic empowerment as defined in 
section 1 of the B-BBEE Act. The Act, in turn, defines B-BBEE as 
“the economic empowerment of all black people7 including women, workers, youth, people with 
disabilities8 and people living in rural areas through diverse but integrated socio-economic strategies 
that include, but are not limited to –
5 Regulation 1 provides that price include all applicable taxes less all unconditional discounts. 
6 B-BEE status level of contributor is defined in Regulation 1 as “the B-BBEE status of an entity in terms 
of a code of good practice on black economic empowerment issued in terms of section 9(1) of the Broad-
Based Black Economic Empowerment Act”. Proof of B-BBEE status level of contributor means (a) the 
B-BBEE status level certificate issued by an authorised body or person; (b) a sworn affidavit as prescribed 
by the B-BBEE Codes of Good Practice; or (c) any other requirement prescribed in terms of the BBBEE 
Act. See Regs 6(4)(a) and (b) and 7(4)(a) and (b).
7 Black people are referred to in Regulation 1 as having the same definition as that in s 1 of the B-BBEEA. 
This Act in turn provides that “black people” is a generic term that means Africans, Coloureds and 
Indians. 
8 This is said in Regulation 1 to have the same meaning as that found in s 1 of the Employment Equity Act 55 
of 1998. This Act defines people with disabilities as people who have a long-term or recurring physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits their prospects of entry into, or advancement in employment. 
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(a) increasing the number of black people that manage, own and control enterprises and productive 
assets;
(b) facilitating ownership and management of enterprises and productive assets by communities, 
workers, cooperative and other collective enterprises;
(c) human resource and skills development;
(d) achieving equitable representation in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce:
(e) public procurement; and
(f) investment in enterprises that are owned or managed by black people.”
In the next section, an explanation of the new subcontracting regulations 
is provided, followed by a critical analysis of the impact of these provisions.
4  Subcontracting as a condition of tender and after award of a 
tender9
Regulation 9 is a new addition to the Regulations. It provides that if it is 
feasible to subcontract in a contract above R30 million, an organ of state must 
do so in order to advance designated groups.10 If an organ of state intends to 
apply subcontracting in terms of this Regulation, it must advertise the tender 
with the specific condition that the successful tenderer must subcontract a 
minimum of 30% of the value of the contract to those groups identified in 
Regulation 4(1).11 In addition to these groups, are exempted micro enterprises 
(“EMEs”)12 or qualifying small business enterprises (“QSEs”)13 which are 
51% owned by black people who live in rural or underdeveloped areas or 
townships and EMEs or SQEs which are at least 51% owned by black people 
who are military veterans.14 Since feasibility is not defined in the Regulations, 
it remains to be seen which criteria will be applied to determine whether 
subcontracting is feasible or not. What the phrase “if feasible” could mean 
will be explored below.
9 A subcontractor is defined in CIDB prescripts as “a natural or juristic person or partnership who is 
contracted by the contractor to assist the latter in the performance of his contract by providing certain 
supplies, services, or engineering and construction works.” See CIDB Code of Conduct for all Parties 
Engaged in Construction Procurement BN 127 in GG 25656 of 31-10-2003 18.
10 Regulation 9(1). A designated group is defined in Regulation 1 as black designated groups, black people, 
women, people with disabilities, or small enterprises as defined in s 1 of the National Small Enterprise Act 
102 of 1996. 
11 Regulation 9(2).
12 Defined in Regulation 1 as an “exempted micro enterprise in terms of a code of good practice on black 
economic empowerment issued in terms of section 9(1) of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Act”.
13 Defined in Regulation 1 as “a qualifying small business enterprise in terms of a code of good practice 
on black economic empowerment issued in terms of section 9(1) of the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act”.
14 A military veteran is described in Regulation 1 as having the same meaning as that in s 1 of the Military 
Veterans Act 18 of 2011 which defines it as any South African citizen who (a) rendered military services 
to any of the military organisations, statutory or non-statutory, which were involved on all sides of South 
Africa’s Liberation War from 1960 to 1994; (b) served in the Union Defence Force before 1961; or (c) 
became a member of the new South African National Defence Force after 1994, and has completed his or 
her military training and no longer performs military service, and has not been dishonourably discharged 
from that military organisation or force: Provided that this definition does not exclude any person referred 
to paragraph (a), (b) or (c) who could not complete his or her military training due to an injury sustained 
during military training or a disease contracted or association with military training.
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In addition to Regulation 9, Regulation 12 provides for subcontracting after 
a tender has been awarded. In other words, a distinction is made between 
providing for subcontracting as a tender condition and subcontracting 
after award of a tender, which has generally been the case until the 2017 
Regulations came into operation. The 2017 Regulations have therefore made 
subcontracting compulsory to a determined group of contracts. The 2011 
PPPFA Regulations15 defined subcontracting,16 but no further provision for 
subcontracting was made in the 2017 Regulations. This was also the case in 
the 2001 Regulations. Therefore, one can assume that subcontracting was a 
generally permitted practice, despite the absence of a theoretical framework 
for it.
5 Current subcontracting practices in construction procurement
The fact that subcontracting is provided for as a qualification criterion and 
after the award of a contract is indicative of a recognition or acknowledgement 
of the importance of subcontracting. Subcontracting has been general practice 
in construction procurement; therefore, the enactment of subcontracting 
provisions in the 2017 Regulations solidifies a long-standing practice. Various 
reasons why subcontracting in construction procurement occurs exist.17 
There may be a need for specific expertise amongst subcontracts necessary 
for a specific project or there may be a need to increase the main contractor’s 
contracting capacity or in order to comply with B-BBEE requirements by 
engaging small, medium and micro enterprises (“SMMEs”) in construction 
procurement tenders. 
At present, there are three types of subcontractors in construction 
procurement.18 First, a domestic subcontractor that is appointed by the 
main contractor at its discretion. Secondly, a nominated subcontractor that 
is nominated by the procuring entity and appointed by the main contractor. 
Lastly, a selected subcontractor that is selected by the main contractor in 
consultation with the procuring entity in terms of contract requirements.
CIDB prescripts note a number of challenges in subcontracting.19 Firstly, 
subcontractors often experience problems regarding non-payment from 
main contractors. Secondly, there is a lack of (legal or labour) representation 
of subcontractors in the case of disputes. This is problematic based on the 
inability of subcontractors to enforce their rights in arbitration or litigation, 
which are the main forms of dispute resolution in construction procurement. It 
is also an expensive exercise for subcontractors to enforce their rights legally 
since they do not have the financial capacity that main contractors have. 
Thirdly, sole authoritarian rights are given to the main contractor, leaving 
15 GN R 502 in GG 34350 of 08-06-2011.
16 Defined in Reg 1(r) as “the primary contractor’s assigning, leasing, making out work to, or employing, 
another person to support such primary contractor in the execution of part of a project in terms of the 
contract;”. The same definition was used in Reg 1 of the 2001 Regulations GN R725 in GG 22549 of 
10-08-2001.
17 CIDB Inform Practice Note 7 Subcontracting Issues (May 2007) 2.
18 2-3.
19 2.
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the subcontractor in a precarious position, which leads to them having less 
bargaining power based on their dependence on main contractors for work. 
In the fourth instance, the main contract and the subcontract often tend to be 
removed from one another. Subcontractors allege that the conditions of the 
latter are less favourable than the former, leaving them with fewer rights. In a 
traditional subcontracting arrangement, the contract is concluded between the 
main contractor and the subcontractor. Therefore, the procuring entity from 
whom the main contractor won the tender is completely removed from this 
relationship.20 The subcontractor can therefore only call on external sources, 
such as a court of law, for legal redress. 
6  The impact of the 2017 Regulations on construction  
procurement
It is submitted that the result of the enactment of subcontracting rules in the 
2017 Regulations is not only that subcontracting has become compulsory in a 
certain group of contracts, but also that the relationships in a subcontracting 
arrangement have changed. The Regulations effectively establish a relationship 
between the procuring government entity and the subcontractor. Therefore, 
a measure of protection is provided to subcontractors when contracting in 
projects above the value indicated in the Regulations. A further consequence 
is that the main contract and the subcontract can no longer be significantly 
different. Although it was never legally permitted to be different based on the 
constitutional section 217 right to procedural fairness, the 2017 Regulations 
solidify this position. 
From these Regulations it would appear that a tripartite relationship is 
in fact created. A relationship between the procuring entity and the main 
contractor, a relationship between the main contractor and the subcontractor 
and, most importantly, a relationship between the procuring entity and the 
subcontractor exists. The latter is an additional relationship that is formed, 
and a procurement network is thus formed. This means that all three parties 
must act fairly and honestly toward one another and no single party has power 
over the relationship. Therefore, it creates an expectation that subcontractors 
will no longer be the victims of financial monopoly as more direct dispute 
resolution involving the organ of state, based on its involvement with the 
subcontractor, is now permitted. The nominated contractor appointed by 
the procuring organ of state, as permitted by CIDB prescripts, established 
a relationship between the subcontractor and the organ of state even before 
the promulgation of the 2017 Regulations. A means of protection should thus 
have already been available to subcontractors. The enactment of Regulation 
9, however, solidifies this relationship in legislation, rather than prescripts, 
which may in practice be regarded as optional to comply with. It should be 
noted that based on this tripartite relationship, the subcontractor does not 
cease to be one. Instructions and payments will still be received from the 
20 CIDB Best Practice Guideline D1 Subcontracting Arrangements (March 2004) 1.
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main contractor. Furthermore, the subcontractor performs only a percentage 
of the contract and not the full contract value.
It is further submitted that although Regulation 9 can be commended, a 
further amendment should be made. When 30% of R30 million as stated 
in Regulation 9 is calculated, it amounts to R9 million. This means that a 
minimum of R9 million must be subcontracted. The significance of this is 
that the CIDB uses a grading system in order to determine the works and 
financial capability of construction contractors.21 In terms of section 18(1) of 
the Act, subcontractors must adhere to this scheme and apply for registration 
on the Register of Contractors provided by the CIDB Act. Contractors are 
then graded according to their ability to complete a contract or project of 
a certain value.22 This means that subcontractors cannot perform any work 
awarded by an organ of state to a main contractor without being registered 
on the CIDB register. Based on the R9 million threshold above, a level six 
contractor and up would qualify as a subcontractor in terms of Regulation 
9.23 These are “medium capacity” contractors who can tender for work up 
to a value of R13 million according to the grading system of the CIDB. In 
other words, they are not SMMEs. Regulation 9 is specifically geared towards 
the development of black people, youth, women, those with disabilities and 
small businesses. However, based on the grading of construction contractors, 
this Regulation fails to address the need to involve and develop SMMEs in 
construction procurement adequately. It is therefore recommended that the 
threshold of R30 million be decreased in order to facilitate the involvement 
and long-term training of smaller contractors. 
Regulation 9 further states that 30% of a R30 million contract must be 
subcontracted if it is feasible to do so. However, the Regulations do not indicate 
what feasibility means neither does it provide a test for feasibility. Therefore, 
it remains to be seen under which circumstances this Regulation will be 
implemented. The requirements to meet feasibility will also have to be stated 
in a call for tenders or request for proposals. It appears that this Regulation 
may permit some discretion as to when it will be feasible to implement, 
which indicates a shift towards a more flexible form of contracting in public 
procurement. The question that remains is whether a regulation making 
subcontracting mandatory is legally permissible or legally enforceable. In 
other words, does legal regulation or a legal framework or rules exist in which 
subcontracting in public procurement can function? Currently, there exists 
no such framework for a provision newly included in the Regulations with no 
legal basis.24 
21 See ch 3 of the CIDB Act.
22 Regulations 7 and 7A set out the requirements to be met by contractors in order to be registered in grades 1 
to 9 with grade 1 being the smallest amount that can be tendered for and grade 9 the largest value contracts 
than can be completed by a contractor. 
23 See the amendment to the CIDB Regulations GN R464 in GG 36629 of 02-07-2013, which provide that 
grade 5 contractors may tender for a contract to the value of R13 million and more. 
24 See AM Anthony The Legal Regulation of Construction Procurement as a Relational Construct in South 
Africa LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch University (2018) in which a legal framework for these provisions 
is proffered. 
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In the next section, a few recommendations for the meaning or interpretation 
of Regulation 9 are made. 
7 Meaning of feasibility
As noted, although feasibility in relation to subcontracting is required by 
the 2017 Regulations, no definition for feasibility is provided. Regulation 9(1) 
appears to be written in peremptory terms in its wording that “an organ of 
state must apply subcontracting”.25 However, the phrase “if feasible” appears 
to create an opportunity to demonstrate that it may not be feasible26 to engage 
in subcontracting. Feasibility is also not defined in any CIDB prescripts. 
The newly published Standard for Minimum Requirements of Engaging 
Contractors and Sub-Contractors on Construction Works Contracts27 does 
not appear to assist in this regard either, as it mainly defines the various 
parties involved in subcontracting.28 However, the Standard for Developing 
Skills through Infrastructure Contracts29 provides some guidelines as to 
how to approach subcontracting in construction procurement. The Standard 
provides for the achievement of contract skills development goals (“CSDG”)30 
and contract skills development credits, which are “the number of learners 
employed by the contractor and placed for continuous training opportunities 
in a three month period”.31 These would be the subcontractors successfully 
up-skilled after the necessary training by the main contractor. The Standard 
provides for four methods through which a CSDG can be achieved32 and 
the aim is that subcontractors be trained to achieve a qualification in the 
industry. The Standard also provides for a denial of credits where the training 
opportunities are not provided for on-site or cannot be directly linked to 
the contract. It will also be denied where inter alia no mentorship plan is 
indicated; interim or final contract compliance reports are lacking; no training 
25 Own emphasis.
26 Described by the Oxford English Dictionary as “possible and practical to do easily or conveniently; 
likely; probable”.
27 GN R881 in GG 41237 of 10-11-2017.
28 These include the employer defined as a “person or organization entering into the contract with the 
principal contractor for the provision of goods, service, or engineering and construction works” which 
would constitute the procuring organ of state. A principal contractor is a “contractor who contracts with 
the employer for the provision of construction works, and who may subcontract part of this contract” and 
a sub-contractor is “the contractor who contracts with the principal contractor for the provision of portions 
of construction works”. See para 2 at 2 of the Standard.
29 GN R863 in GG 36760 of 23-08-2013.
30 Defined in para 2 at 2 as “the number of hours or head count of skills development opportunities that 
a contractor contracts to provide in relation to work directly related to the contract or order up to: a) 
completion in the case of a professional service contract; b) the end of the service period in the case 
of a service contract; and c) practical completion in the case of an engineering and construction works 
contract.”
31 See para 2 of the Standard.
32 These are first by providing “structured workplace learning opportunities for learners toward the 
attainment of a part or a full occupation qualification;” secondly, “structured workplace learning 
opportunities for apprentices or other artisan learners towards the attainment of a trade qualification 
leading to a listed trade … subject to at least 60% of the artisan learners being holders of public FET 
college qualifications;” thirdly by providing “work integrated learning opportunities for University of 
Technology or Comprehensive University students completing their national diplomas;” and lastly by 
providing “structured workplace opportunities for candidates towards registration in a professional 
category by a statutory council listed in Table 1” provided in the Standard.
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plans for learners are provided; the mentorship is not in accordance with the 
requirements of the applicable professional body or statutory council; and the 
structured workplace learning is not in line with the curriculum requirements 
of the qualifications for professional registration.33
The listed factors for denial of credits could form a basis for feasibility of 
subcontracting as required by Regulation 9. This would include demonstrating 
a training plan, indicating that the training complies with professional body 
requirements, indicating the persons directly responsible for the training and 
when reports will be made available. Should this be regarded as too onerous 
or too comprehensive to submit in time for a tender closure date and time, it is 
recommended that contractors should indicate their record for subcontracting 
over a period of time such as five years as one of the requirements for the 
test of feasibility.34 In other words, contractors who have not subcontracted in 
accordance with a certain threshold such as 30% of the contract value should 
indicate how they intend to implement contracting in the contract tendered 
for. Another requirement could be an indication of a certain number of 
professionals employed by the tenderer, which could potentially indicate the 
ability of the contractor to provide training to subcontractors. It is submitted 
that “economic feasibility” as a potential requirement should be avoided 
as contractors may attempt to prove that it is not economically feasible by 
tendering abnormally low prices. Awarding extra points for subcontracting 
may also not be permissible as Regulation 4 already provides for evaluation 
of preference as a pre-qualification criterion where a minimum of 30% of the 
contract value is shown to be subcontracted to an EME or SQE.
8 Conclusion
Subcontracting has for the longest time been common practice in the 
construction industry. With the promulgation of the 2017 PPPFA Regulations, 
subcontracting was introduced as a compulsory element of procuring 
goods and services in the case of contracts above a certain value. This 
substantially changed the relationships in government contracting. Previously, 
subcontracting was a contractual relationship between the main contractor 
and the subcontractor only. However, the introduction of these regulations 
now creates a relationship between the procuring organ of state and the 
subcontractor. This in turn provides a measure of protection to subcontractors 
who previously had no recourse in the case of abuse or non-payment for their 
work. A tripartite relationship is thus established between the organ of state 
and the main contractor, the main contractor and the subcontractor and lastly 
between the organ of state and the subcontractor. 
In addition to making subcontracting compulsory, the Regulations 
introduced the requirement of feasibility for subcontracting. In other words, a 
main contractor must contract a certain value of the contract to a subcontractor 
33 See paras 3.3 and 3.4 of the Standard.
34 The five years is synonymous with the time for which contractors must provide their financial and works 
information to the CIDB in order to tender for government contracts in Reg 11 of the CIDB Regulations.
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if it is feasible to do so. However, no indication of what feasibility could 
mean is given. Neither a definition nor a test for feasibility is provided. It is 
thus recommended that the factors for a denial of credits in the Standard for 
Developing Skills through Infrastructure Contracts noted above may serve 
as a basis from which to build criteria to determine feasibility. This would 
include inter alia a demonstration on the part of the main contractor that it is 
able to provide the necessary training in order to up-skill the subcontractor 
so that the subcontracting arrangement can have optimal benefits for all 
parties involved. It is further recommended that economic feasibility not be 
used as a factor in order to avoid the submission of abnormally low bids. If 
these vacuums in the Regulations can be addressed adequately, it could go a 
long way in developing subcontractors to become competitive contractors in 
construction procurement.
SUMMARY
The 2017 Preferential Procurement Regulations brought about vast changes to the legal landscape 
of construction procurement, specifically with regard to subcontracting. This article evaluates the 
impact of these regulations and the effect these changes may have on construction procurement and 
the construction industry at large. Recommendations are made where vacuums in the legal framework 
are found.
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